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Borders are back, and with a vengeance. Not that they were ever really gone. As a number 
of studies over the last few years have demonstrated, the ‘de-bordering’ many thought they 
observed within Europe after 1989 was always accompanied by a forceful ‘re-bordering’ along the 
perimeter of the European Union, even if it long remained invisible to EU citizens. Yet with 
sufficient inattention to the militarization of Europe’s Mediterranean border, it was possible from 
the Schengen implementation in 1995 until the so-called ‘refugee crisis’ of 2015 to think that 
Germany had exchanged the Berlin Wall for open borders, much as postwar Europe had 
abandoned earlier debates about ‘bleeding borders’ and aspirations to ‘natural’ ones. But upon 
closer inspection, there was always plenty of continuity in every rupture, plenty of transfer from 
one space to the next. A 2014 protest by the performance artists of the Centre for Political 
Beauty drew attention to the discomfort created by bringing together different border paradigms. 
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A week before the 25th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall, the group removed the white 
crosses outside the Bundestag memorializing those shot trying to escape East Germany during 
the Cold War. In the days that followed, similar crosses were photographed in the company of 
North African and Middle Eastern refugees along the Moroccan-Spanish border near Melilla and 
the Bulgarian and Greek borders with Turkey. The comparison between the ‘Iron Curtain’ and 
‘Fortress Europe’ was, for many Germans, too close for comfort. An online poll on the protest 
action revealed that 60% disapproved of the action, either because they saw it as monument 
desecration or because they felt ‘escape from the GDR and refugee flows today are two entirely 
different topics’.1  
Borders have become objects of intense public debate over the past few years, as unequal 
mobility across them has become increasingly associated with economic inequality between 
societies, and even within them. Though the debate has so far been much more acrimonious 
elsewhere (the United States, Britain, Poland, Austria), Germany’s economic and geographic 
position within Europe make it a particularly sensitive case. So too does its history. The borders 
of Germany (and therefore also of its immediate neighbours) have been among the least stable in 
Europe over the past two centuries, with most major changes to German territory linked to 
fundamental political restructuring—usually in the wake of wartime defeat. 2   A number of 
historians have examined the borders of Germany and of Europe over the last few years, using 
an increasingly diverse range of sources and approaches to provide new insights into sometimes 
classic questions about what borders mean and how people live with them.  
This recent scholarship has drawn in part on the sophisticated theoretical literature that 
has developed in interdisciplinary border studies. While borders are commonly thought of in 
terms of lines on a map, they can equally be conceived as zones (‘borderlands’), which might be 
open and indeterminate (‘frontiers’); interactions within these spaces of liminality and overlap can 
lead to ‘hybridity’ or, on the contrary, to the reification and assertion of difference.3 The ongoing 
‘spatial turn’ has led to understandings of borders that mirror more complex understandings of 
‘space’ generally: they are not the fixed products of a completed process, but are continually 
                                                 
1 Rundfunk Berlin-Brandenburg (2014), Gedenkkreuze für Mauertote entwendet: Wie finden Sie die Aktion? 
https://www.rbb24.de/politik/beitrag/2014/11/kreuze-mauertote-denkmal-diebstahl.html (Accessed 11 Jul. 2015). 
2 G. Eley, ʻHow and Where is German History Centered?ʼ, in N. Gregor, N.H. Roemer and M. Roseman (eds.), 
German History from the Margins (Bloomington, 2006), pp. 268–286, here p. 268; V. Conze, ʻDie Grenzen der 
Niederlage. Kriegsniederlagen und territoriale Verluste im Grenz-Diskurs in Deutschland (1918–1970)ʼ, in H. Carl, 
H.-H. Kortüm, D. Langewiesche and F. Lenger (eds.), Kriegsniederlagen: Erfahrungen und Erinnerungen (Berlin, 2004), pp. 
163–184, here p. 165; A. Demandt, R. Hansen, I. Mieck, J. Riedmann, H.-D. Schultz, H. Wagner and K. Zernack 
(eds.), Deutschlands Grenzen in der Geschichte (München, 1990).  
3 A.C. Diener and J. Hagen, ʻIntroduction. Borders, Identity, and Geopoliticsʼ, in A.C. Diener and J. Hagen (eds.), 
Borderlines and Borderlands: Political Oddities at the Edge of the Nation-State (Lanham, MD, 2010), pp. 1–14, here pp. 9–10. 
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reproduced through practices and performances.4 Indeed, bordering (and de-bordering) might be 
seen as ‘processes that cannot be finalized’.5 For historians then, borders are socially constructed 
and unstable, subject to interpretation and redefinition.  
Longstanding questions about the identities, discourses, and practices connected with 
borders continue to be asked, but their answers are increasingly inflected by notions of 
indeterminacy and social construction. The concept of ‘national indifference’, for example, draws 
attention to the shortcomings and failures of nationalist projects, focusing on those people who 
rejected exclusive belonging, switched affinities between nation-states, or embraced regional and 
local identities instead.6 Postcolonial scholarship too has had an impact on research into borders 
in (and of) Europe, as historians have drawn on concepts such as ‘hybridity’ and ‘mimicry’ or 
used colonial analogies to explain other social hierarchies within borderlands. While borders were 
long studied through the lens of diplomatic sources, recent scholarship has moved to maps, 
engineering plans, photos, and memoirs that provide insight into the physical characteristics as 
well as the emotional meanings of borders. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, there is 
increasing attention to how local realities within borderlands differ from the plans emanating 
from imperial or national centres.  
These theoretical and methodological trends have made themselves felt broadly, but the 
conclusions historians draw tend to depend largely on the historiographies of which particular 
border region they are examining. Along the French-German border, scholars have long been 
fascinated with how nineteenth-century nationalist conflict eventually gave way to European 
cooperation. Recent books (reviewed in the first section below) illustrate how unexpected and 
sometimes unintended entanglements contributed to the transnational development of the Upper 
Rhine Valley between France and Germany. Along Germany’s eastern borders (addressed in the 
second section), the prevalence of national conflict and forced migration has given rise to a 
sophisticated historiography of identity that examines how states claimed or rejected populations 
there. The books reviewed in this section focus largely on the incompleteness and frustrations of 
nationalizing processes in ‘Central Europe’ and the ways in which local populations responded to 
them. With regard to the Cold War border between East and West Germany (discussed in the 
third section), recent studies have transnationalized questions from GDR historiography about 
                                                 
4 M. Löw, Raumsoziologie (Frankfurt am Main, 2001), pp. 13–15. 
5 J.W. Scott, ʻEuropean Politics of Borders, Border Symbolism and Cross-Border Cooperationʼ, in T.M. Wilson and 
H. Donnan (eds.), A Companion to Border Studies (Chichester, 2012), pp. 83–99, here p. 84. 
6 T. Zahra, ʻImagined Noncommunities: National Indifference as a Category of Analysisʼ, Slavic Review, 69, 1 (2010), 
pp. 93–119. The literature on national indifference is by now voluminous. Other key studies include J. King, 
Budweisers into Czechs and Germans: A Local History of Bohemian Politics, 1848-1948 (Princeton, NJ, 2002); P.M. Judson, 
Guardians of the Nation: Activists on the Language Frontiers of Imperial Austria (Cambridge, MA, 2006); J.E. Bjork, Neither 
German nor Pole: Catholicism and National Indifference in a Central European Borderland (Ann Arbor, MI, 2008). 
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state-society relations and everyday life. These authors argue that the ‘Iron Curtain’ was shaped 
not only by systemic competition between states but by power relations between each state and 
the local populations within and just beyond its borders. Finally, in the literature on Europe’s 
external borders since 1989 (section four), historians and social scientists have explored how 
anxieties about migration, often inherited from earlier periods, have driven the construction of 
post-Cold War Germany and Europe. Taken together, these texts illustrate multiple methods for 
tackling overlapping questions and suggest the potential for further comparative work to disrupt 
and reconstruct narratives about Europe and Germany’s place in it.  
 
I. Borrowing from ‘the enemy’ in the West 
The Franco-German border has shifted repeatedly over time, most infamously as the twin 
provinces of Alsace and Lorraine changed hands from France to Germany and back in 1870, 
1918, 1940, and 1945. Alsace, especially its northern half with the city of Strasbourg, is therefore 
often used as shorthand for the border along the Rhine and occasionally as a metonym for 
broader European relations. (Lorraine tends to be studied mostly in connection with Alsace, 
while Saarland—often coveted by France but unrepentantly German through plebiscite after 
plebiscite—generally receives short shrift by comparison. 7 ) Alsace has been studied as a 
transnational zone of conflict, contact, and cooperation: a ‘laboratory’ of nation-building in the 
past and now of Europeanization.  
In close connection with this, a major interest of (foreign) scholars has related to 
questions of regional identity.8 Catherine Dunlop’s Cartophilia examines identity through the lens 
of cartographic sources, starting with those produced by monarchies, militaries, and empires in 
order to provide a ‘commanding view’ that would bring ‘order and homogeneity to the visual 
                                                 
7 On differences between Alsace and Lorraine (the latter often referred to by the name of the French département of 
Moselle), see A. Baumann, ʻDie Erfindung des Grenzlandes Elsass-Lothringenʼ, in B. Olschowsky (ed.), Geteilte 
Regionen — geteilte Geschichtskulturen?: Muster der Identitätsbildung im europäischen Vergleich (München, 2013), pp. 163–183; 
A. Carrol and L. Zanoun, ʻThe View from the Border. A Comparative Study of Autonomism in Alsace and the 
Moselle, 1918–29ʼ, European Review of History: Revue europeenne d'histoire, 18, 4 (2011), pp. 465–486. On the Saarland, see 
B. Long, No Easy Occupation: French Control of the German Saar, 1944-1957 (Rochester, NY, 2015) and the earlier work 
of Rainer Hudemann, including R. Hudemann, A. Heinen and S. Dengel, Das Saarland zwischen Frankreich, Deutschland 
und Europa 1945-1957: Ein Quellen- und Arbeitsbuch (Saarbrücken, 2007).  
8 A. Carrol, ʻLes historiens anglophones et l’Alsace. Une fascination durableʼ, Revue d’Alsace, 138 (2012), pp. 265–283. 
For comprehensive studies of Alsatian identities, see also C.J. Fischer, Alsace to the Alsatians?: Visions and Divisions of 
Alsatian Regionalism, 1870-1939 (New York, 2010) and G. Riederer, Feiern im Reichsland: Politische Symbolik, öffentliche 
Festkultur und die Erfindung kollektiver Zugehörigkeiten in Elsaß-Lothringen (1871–1918) (Trier, 2004). French-language 
historiography tends to shoehorn studies of Alsace into regional history. See L. Boswell, ʻRethinking the Nation at 
the Peripheryʼ, French Politics, Culture & Society, 27, 2 (2009), pp. 111–126, here p. 118. 
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image of the state’.9 French technical expertise in cartography was developed first under the 
Ancien Régime, and later shared with the German states under French occupation as Napoleon 
enlisted them to map parts of his empire. Compatible cartographic knowledge allowed for 
extensive re-use by each new ruler. The first German map of Alsace was based explicitly on the 
Carte de France, with subsequent, new land surveys relying on prior triangulation points. When 
France retook Alsace in 1918, it waited several years before sending in surveyors, contenting itself 
in the interim with a ‘new’ map that mostly just renamed towns.10 In this sense, the projection of 
power onto—and via maps—frequently involved recycling available information and even 
borrowing it from competitors.11   
Dunlop identifies similar evidence of layering and recycling in cadastral maps of Alsatian 
towns under German and then French rule. These not only copied basic data but recreated the 
accompanying decorative illustration of a farmer with a surveyor’s tripod. Save for the German 
farmer’s meatier physique or the French Republican coat of arms on a nearby shield (unadorned 
on the German version so towns could add their own insignia), the illustrations were practically 
identical.12 Non-state actors who engaged in what Dunlop describes as ‘popular cartography’ 
likewise borrowed freely from their ‘foreign’ counterparts. The Vogesenclub, founded as a pro-
German landscape tourism group, became the Club Vosgien after 1918, directly copying the 
German club’s statutes and even ‘obtaining the full collection of the German club’s lithographic 
printing stones from Stuttgart’.13  
Maps have also been tools of nationalists and nationalism, particularly when it came to 
outlining the (disjunctive) boundaries of language, culture, and the state. Like the other early 
maps Dunlop discusses, the first maps of language groups in France were commissioned by 
Napoleon for the purpose of imperial rule, to establish the centres and peripheries of ‘France’s 
five “mother languages”: French, German, Flemish, Breton, and Basque’.14 From the 1840s on, 
German mapmakers began to create linguistic maps for a different purpose: depicting a possible 
‘German’ nation that was still ‘in the making’.15 An 1844 map by Karl Bernhardi not only left the 
line separating Francophone from Germanophone regions as a deliberate blur, it omitted 
                                                 
9 C.T. Dunlop, Cartophilia: Maps and the Search for Identity in the French-German Borderland (Chicago, 2015), p. 26. For a 
related approach in a different context, see S. Seegel, Mapping Europe's Borderlands: Russian Cartography in the Age of 
Empire (Chicago, 2012). 
10 Dunlop, Cartophilia, p. 39. 
11 This was also true for colonial Africa, where European rulers, for lack of resources, recycled the ‘imprecise and 
fragmentary’ maps of their predecessors. Even more than in Europe itself, such maps were a visual projection of 
colonial power that was not always able to make its presence felt on the ground. U. Jureit, Das Ordnen von Räumen: 
Territorium und Lebensraum im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert (Hamburg, 2012), pp. 119–120. 
12 Dunlop, Cartophilia, pp. 98–99. 
13 Ibid., p. 155. 
14 Ibid., p. 73. 
15 Ibid., p. 77. 
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altogether the borders of the supposedly corresponding states. That state and linguistic-cultural 
boundaries so poorly aligned was a source of constant irritation to nationalists after 1870. 
Heinrich Kiepert’s map of Sprachgebiete marked ‘the official border with a cross-marked line’, but 
‘the language border with a thick red line’, demonstrating how the language boundary of the 
Kulturnation was more salient and significant than that of the state. Meanwhile, Alsatian 
cartographers such as Pastor Louis-Gustave Liebich produced their own maps of local dialect use, 
encouraging the idea that Alsace was a region apart (whether it was within France or Germany).16  
Equally irritating for nationalists on all sides was the failure of ‘natural’ borders to hold 
state or nation together in any meaningful sense. French philosophes and German Romantics both 
made arguments for the intrinsic superiority of nature and the limits it supposedly set.17 French 
claims of the Rhine as France’s ‘natural’ border antedate the Revolution (with ancient Gaul as a 
supposed precedent).18 After Napoleon’s armies marched well beyond it, Germans such as Ernst 
Moritz Arndt advanced counter-claims to the entire Rhine as ‘Germany’s River, Not Germany’s 
Border’.19 Yet as borders go, the Rhine was particularly difficult to mark and map. As Dunlop 
notes, ‘Mapping the boundary line soon turned into a nascent canalization project; the only way 
to create the border was to stabilize the Rhine’s constantly shifting river topography.’20  
This and other engineering projects are the subject of Christoph Bernhardt’s ‘social and 
institutional history’ of the Rhine.21 Well into the nineteenth century, changes in the river’s course 
moved towns from one side to the other or flooded them off the map entirely. National and 
natural shifts complicated one another in ways that could be difficult to disentangle. After 
Napoleon’s defeat and the repudiation of his 1801 Treaty of Lunéville, it took six years for an 
international commission to ‘restore’ the former European order on the ground: many border 
markers had been washed away or destroyed by aggrieved locals; worse still, entire islands in the 
middle of the Rhine had disappeared, only to be replaced by new ones elsewhere—some as a 
result of towns and individuals damming river sections to expand their landholdings.22 These 
                                                 
16 Ibid., pp. 82–85. 
17 Ibid., pp. 49–52. 
18 Ibid., p. 50 and P. Sahlins, ʻNatural Frontiers Revisited: France's Boundaries since the Seventeenth Century. The 
American Historical Reviewʼ, American Historical Review, 95, 5 (1990), pp. 1423–1451. 
19 See D. Suckow, ʻDer Rhein als politischer Mythos in Deutschland und Frankreichʼ, in K. Schlögel and B. Halicka 
(eds.), Oder-Odra: Blicke auf einen europäischen Strom (Frankfurt am Main, 2007), pp. 47–60, here pp. 48–51; B. Halicka, 
ʻRhein und Weichsel. Erfundene Flüsse oder Die Verkörperung des "Nationalgeistes"ʼ, in H.H. Hahn and R. Traba 
(eds.), Parallelen (Paderborn, 2012), pp. 71–93, here pp. 73–74. For the later history of such claims, see also P. 
Schöttler, ʻThe Rhine as an Object of Historical Controversy in the Inter-War Years. Towards a History of Frontier 
Mentalitiesʼ, History Workshop Journal, 39 (1995), pp. 1–21. 
20 Dunlop, Cartophilia, p. 27. 
21 C. Bernhardt, Im Spiegel des Wassers: Eine transnationale Umweltgeschichte des Oberrheins (1800–2000) (Köln, 2016), p. 20. 
See also M. Cioc, The Rhine: An Eco-Biography, 1815–2000 (Seattle, 2002) and D. Blackbourn, The Conquest of Nature: 
Water, Landscape, and the Making of Modern Germany (London, 2006). 
22 Bernhardt, Im Spiegel des Wassers, pp. 116–117. 
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problems hint at the motivations for the earliest engineering works on the Rhine: first and 
foremost, flood control and, secondarily, land reclamation. With the dawn of industrialization, 
these would give way to navigation, commercial use, and hydroelectric power generation. The 
river would thus be engineered and re-engineered repeatedly over time to suit competing 
purposes.  
In Bernhardt’s telling, engineering ambitions for the Rhine were transnational from the 
start: the plans articulated by Johann Gottfried Tulla (mythologized in the existing historiography 
and partly deconstructed here) were developed on the basis of ideas shared with French 
engineers, and they necessitated cooperation between France and Baden (as well as Bavaria and 
Prussia).23 Nationalism and national competition were rarely significant obstacles to this shared 
technical vision. Conflicts were more likely to involve upstream and downstream cities, tensions 
between environmental management and industrial use, or mutually exclusive technical solutions. 
Where other authors have argued, for example, that sewage waste disposal in post-1870 
Straßburg was opposed by French Alsatians as a form of ‘German’ modernization, Bernhardt 
argues that it was ‘primarily… social-technical arguments’ that actually drove the debate—and 
that these were part of transnational, European city planning discourses.24 He also highlights how 
German authorities in 1917 considered canal plans that were remarkably similar to France’s 
Grand Canal d’Alsace, which Germany later vigorously opposed.25 Nationalist competition did 
significantly affect Rhine hydro-engineering after the First World War, but plans were bilaterally 
negotiated after the Second World War and cooperatively implemented from the late 1960s on, 
feeding into narratives of increasing Europeanization.26  
Bernhardt and Dunlop are both consciously transnational in approach, bringing together 
sources from different sides of this contested borderland and examining them in relation to the 
circulation of technical knowledge. As a study of national identity, Cartophilia provides a narrative 
that is mostly in keeping with a well-established regionalist paradigm rather than, say, the concept 
of national indifference. Dunlop’s great innovation is to tell this story almost exclusively through 
the creative and well-informed interpretation of map sources, no aspect of which seems to have 
escaped her attention. Bernhardt’s study likewise demonstrates astoundingly comprehensive 
knowledge of hydrological engineering and planning processes that reshaped the Rhine. At times, 
one gets the impression that he therefore privileges technical explanations over social and 
political discourses that may well have been constitutive elements of conflict. However, his book 
amply demonstrates that cooperation can and often does prevail, even in disputed territories that 
                                                 
23 Ibid., p. 85. 
24 Ibid., pp. 343–355. 
25 Ibid., pp. 370–371. 
26 Ibid., p. 438. 
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are subject to extensive outside intervention. Furthermore, it shows that while borders are indeed 
places onto which nation-states project power, they are also places full stop, subject to interests 
that might be locally specific or regionally overarching and to problems that are technical or 
environmental as much as social and political in nature. As with the French and German 
cartographers Dunlop studies, Bernhardt’s engineers were able to recycle or borrow freely from 
one another in part because their goals were compatible, they drew on shared expertise, and their 
plans were anchored in overlapping spaces.  
 
II. Expansion and expulsion in the East 
At first glance, the history of Germany’s eastern border appears less suited to narratives 
of mutual borrowing and shared development. The Polish-German border in particular carries far 
heavier historical baggage than the French-German border. Yet as several recent books argue, 
even seemingly non-transferable phenomena such as nationalism were in circulation across 
Germany’s eastern borders. Both Germans and Poles have imagined their shared border zone as 
an American-style ‘frontier’ to be conquered: what was ‘Germany’s Wild East’ in the nineteenth 
century became ‘Poland’s Wild West’ after the Second World War. 27  The autochthonous 
population that had long lived in contested regions like Upper Silesia found itself caught in 
between these nationalist conflicts, and responded with rejection, ambivalence, and indifference.28 
As Poland’s borders shifted and Germany’s borders shrank after the Second World War, forced 
migration came to define the experiences of both Poles and Germans. The former struggled to 
appropriate (aneignen) the space and material culture29 of  the once-German lands and homes in 
which they now resided, while the latter had to adjust to a new life in a very different Germany, 
usually separated from their previous Heimat by the so-called ‘Iron Curtain’. For these expellees 
as well as Sudeten Germans fleeing Czechoslovakia, defeat in the Second World War thus 
became immediately and inextricably linked to the constraints of a much longer Cold War.   
Uncertainties about Germany’s eastern border are rooted in the region’s historically 
heterogeneous composition. ‘German’ presence in Poland dates back to Teutonic Knights in the 
13th century, whose pre-national domains ultimately fed into Hohenzollern Prussia. 30  At the 
                                                 
27 K.L. Kopp, Germany's Wild East: Constructing Poland as Colonial Space (Ann Arbor, MI, 2012); B. Halicka, Polens Wilder 
Westen: Erzwungene Migration und die kulturelle Aneignung des Oderraums 1945–1948 (Paderborn, 2013). 
28 P. Polak-Springer, Recovered Territory: A German-Polish Conflict over Land and Culture, 1919–89 (New York, 2015); J.J. 
Kulczycki, Belonging to the Nation: Inclusion and Exclusion in the Polish-German Borderlands, 1939–1951 (Cambridge, MA, 
2016). 
29 I have translated the term kulturelle Aneignung here and elsewhere as the ‘appropriation of space and material culture’ 
for clarity. As used here, the concept does not have the negative connotations associated with the more direct 
English translation, ‘cultural appropriation’, which is frequently used to refer to the unreflective or insulting 
misappropriation of subaltern culture by privileged groups.  
30 See N. Davies, Vanished Kingdoms: The History of Half-Forgotten Europe (London, 2011), pp. 325–393. 
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intersection of different languages but also different multi-ethnic empires, Germans, Poles, Jews, 
and others coexisted (however uneasily at times) under various sovereignties until the age of 
nationalism in the nineteenth century.31 Germans, anxious to consolidate their own nation but 
also to catch up with other European imperial powers, imagined themselves as colonial masters 
in Eastern Europe, drawing on American and African analogies in the process. Kristin Kopp 
shows how novels such as Gustav Freytag’s 1855 bestseller Soll und Haben or later novels set in 
Prussia’s Eastern Marches cast Germans in a civilizing role vis-à-vis Eastern Europe. ‘Poland’ (to 
which Freytag’s novel refers even though the state had then been partitioned out of existence) 
was thereby constructed as an American-style frontier for Germans to settle or as the home of an 
inferior, ‘racially contagious’ population characterized by the chaos of polnische Wirtschaft.32  
This vacillation between ‘megalomania and angst’ only increased with the First World 
War.33 As Kopp argues in a chapter devoted to cartography, maps were here too a key tool for 
making territorial claims. Pan-Germanist mapmakers such as Professor Dieter Schäfer filled 
Eastern Europe with lightly shaded spaces onto which they could project a ‘German’ population. 
Schäfer’s 1916 map of Europe’s Länder und Völker downplayed or ignored the presence of 
significant minorities among Germans (Jews, Kashubs, Sorbs) while highlighting the supposed 
‘German admixture’ of populations in other areas. For Schäfer, the East was a chaotic place, with 
‘“peoples and population fragments… so jumbled up by the course of history that it would be 
impossible to separate them by any continuous borders”’. 34  A different but related practice 
prevailed in German maps of Africa, as Ulrike Jureit argues in her comparative study of colonial 
Southwest Africa, Ober Ost during the First World War, and Nazi Lebensraum. On colonial maps, 
the absence of European knowledge about peoples and populations produced abundant ‘blank 
spaces’ that came to represent ‘colonial potential’ that Germans were incited to fulfil.35  
Both Kopp’s analysis of colonialist culture and Jureit’s comparison of spatial imaginings 
pose questions about imperialist continuities, but the two authors come to rather different 
conclusions. Kopp argues that Poland and Southwest Africa ‘were ideologically linked, 
constituent parts of an overarching German imperial project’, which ultimately created a ‘point of 
                                                 
31 On how German understandings of Eastern neighbours shifted over time, see V.G. Liulevicius, The German Myth of 
the East (Oxford, 2009). 
32 The term often is translated as ‘economic mismanagement’, but is employed in ways that evoke ‘the condition of a 
primitive people unable to fully manage the stresses and responsibilities of civilized life’. Kopp, Germany's Wild East, 
86-70; see also H. Orłowski, "Polnische Wirtschaft": Zum deutschen Polendiskurs der Neuzeit (Wiesbaden, 1996).  
33 G. Thum, ʻMegalomania and Angst. The Nineteenth-Century Mythicization of Germany's Eastern Borderlandsʼ, 
in O. Bartov and E.D. Weitz (eds.), Shatterzone of Empires: Coexistence and Violence in the German, Habsburg, Russian, and 
Ottoman Borderlands (Bloomington, IN, 2013), pp. 42–60. 
34 Quoted in Kopp, Germany's Wild East, p. 131. 
35 Jureit, Das Ordnen von Räumen, p. 125. 
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consensus’ in German society to which Hitler was then able to appeal.36 Jureit, on the other hand, 
argues that there was not one ‘continuous, consistent’ spatial principle linking German 
imperialisms, in part because colonialism was about subordination and exploitation rather than 
‘racial-biological homogenization’.37 Colonial analogies would nevertheless continue to condition 
Germans’ self-image well past the turn of the century.   
After Germany’s 1918 defeat, that self-image radicalized in ways that fostered embittered 
irredentism.38 In this context, Kopp shows how maps were used to inculcate schoolchildren with 
understandings of national belonging that were fundamentally anchored in space. In a prelude to 
later West German maps that would show areas east of the Oder-Neisse line ‘under temporary 
Polish administration’, the 1921 Convention of German Geographers called for all maps for 
school use to include the pre-1918 German border.39 A further set of school maps emphasized 
the expansiveness of an ‘essentialized Kulturboden’, in which the supposedly ‘civilizing’ qualities of 
past German ‘cultural work’ (Kulturarbeit) were made into a permanent characteristic of the 
landscape.40 Germanness was thus embedded in land itself, much as the Nazis claimed it to be 
embedded also in the body. Ideas about the supposed ‘blood and soil’ roots of identity were 
reinforced by biological metaphors for lost territories as ‘amputated limbs’ or a ‘bleeding 
border’.41  
Yet as Peter Polak-Springer points out, neither the biologization of territory nor violent 
irredentism was exclusively German: for example, Polish nationalists argued that the border set 
by the League of Nations following the 1921 plebiscite had ‘“cut the living organism of the 
Polish peoples in Upper Silesia in two, thereby creating a situation which we insurgents have 
never recognized and will never recognize”’.42 This is but one illustration of Polak-Springer’s 
larger argument that a ‘transnational culture of irredentism’ developed in Upper Silesia, as 
German revanchists and Polish insurgents mimicked one another in nearly every domain. In this 
contested territory, German and Polish authorities sponsored rallies near the border (Polish ones 
were famous for their after-midnight gun salutes), used imposing architecture to lay claim to 
space (e.g. the ‘Deutschland, Deutschland über alles’ inscription atop the Nazis’ forty-metre-high 
Borderland Tower in Ratibor43), and enlisted folklorists to assert the primordial Germanness or 
                                                 
36 Kopp, Germany's Wild East, p. 23.  
37 Jureit, Das Ordnen von Räumen, 390, 394. 
38 For a fascinating examination of other German responses to border changes in and after World War I, see A.H. 
Sammartino, The Impossible Border: Germany and the East, 1914–1922 (Ithaca, 2010). 
39 Kopp, Germany's Wild East, p. 135, drawing on G.H. Herb, Under the Map of Germany: Nationalism and Propaganda 
1918-1945 (London, 1997). 
40 Kopp, Germany's Wild East, p. 205. 
41 Ibid., pp. 139–140. 
42 Polak-Springer, Recovered, p. 59. 
43 Ibid., 110, 112. 
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Polishness of the region and its people. As with maps in Alsace, monuments to one regime were 
simply relabelled or repurposed when territory changed hands: the Voivodeship Government 
Building in Katowice, built as a paean to Polishness by voivode Michał Grażyński, found its way 
onto postcards promoting Nazi-era Kattowitz—its unambiguously Polish insignia ‘R.P.’ 
(Rzeczpospolita Polska, ‘Republic of Poland’) reinterpreted to mean Regierungs-Präsidium 
(‘government headquarters’).44 The net effect of German and Polish nationalists both claiming 
Upper Silesia for their side was the profound alienation of the very people living there. Residents 
resented outside elites of all stripes and even adapted their insults to successive rulers: 
administrators from interwar Poland were derided as carpetbagging gorole (‘mountaineers’ in local 
dialect), their Nazi usurpers as Westgorole; ‘P.G.’ was used as a tongue-in-cheek abbreviation for 
Nazi Parteigenossen—or for pierońskie gorole (‘damned mountaineers’).45 As these examples illustrate, 
irredentism irritated the population in contested areas like Upper Silesia, leading them to embrace 
national indifference in response. 
Indifference proved a difficult position to maintain in the face of the Second World War 
though, and not only in Upper Silesia. Both under the Nazi occupiers and the Polish socialists 
that succeeded them, evidence of national belonging became critical to accessing welfare and 
exercising basic rights, as Jan Kulczycki stresses in his study of national identity policies in the 
Polish-German borderlands.46 This was particularly extreme during the Second World War, when 
self-declared ‘Poles’ in Nazi-annexed regions were deported to the Generalgouvernement (or worse), 
while ‘Germans’ were accorded privileges and property. Under such obviously coercive 
conditions, even the Nazis did not take the population’s professions of Germanness at face value, 
setting up the Deutsche Volksliste (DVL) as a means of sorting them into categories: category I 
(14% of the 2.5 Million registered) and II (13%) received full citizenship, while the far more 
numerous ‘threes’ (65%) had only revocable citizenship, even as they were subject to 
conscription; ‘fours’ (6%) were considered potentially ‘disloyal’ (abtrünnig), but in regions like 
Wartheland many were promoted to category III later in the war to incentivize service to the 
Nazis.47 As this implies, nationality policies were anything but consistent. DVL classification 
criteria, for example, varied over time and from one Reichsgau to the next, emphasizing language, 
                                                 
44 Ibid., 96-7, 156-7. This reappropariation of the symbols of Polish Upper Silesia was made all the easier by the fact 
that Grażyński’s properly irredentist decorations also included references to supposedly Polish towns in German 
Upper Silesia. 
45 Ibid., p. 150. 
46 Kulczycki, Belonging to the Nation. 
47 For details, see G. Janusz, ʻDie rechtlichen Regelungen Polens zum Status der deutschen Bevölkerung in den 
Jahren 1938 bis 1950ʼ, in M. Kittel (ed.), Deutschsprachige Minderheiten 1945: Ein europäischer Vergleich (München, 2007), 
pp. 131–189, here p. 136. On similar classification schemes in East-West comparison, see T. Zahra, ʻThe 'Minority 
Problem' and National Classification in the French and Czechoslovak Borderlandsʼ, Contemporary European History, 17, 
2 (2008), pp. 137–165. 
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‘racial’ background, political leanings, or ‘behaviour’ (i.e. membership in German nationalist 
organizations prior to the war). Registration remained voluntary in the Generalgouvernement, but 
was spurred on by ultimatum in Wartheland and by the deliberate relaxation of criteria in Silesia.48 
Kulczycki argues that ‘neither victimization nor active collaboration with the Germans’ was the 
norm in the German-Polish borderlands: ‘Most simply adapted to the situation and sought to 
ensure their own survival and that of their families, even at the price of far-reaching moral and 
political compromises’.49  
After the war ended, the DVL was turned on its head, with the post-war Polish state 
initially interpreting past registration as a sign of irreducible foreignness, unforgivable treachery, 
or shameful opportunism. Accordingly, Volksdeutsche were to be punished and, whenever possible, 
expelled or otherwise compelled to leave. Following mass expulsions though, emphasis shifted to 
‘verification’ and ‘rehabilitation’ procedures that would allow Poland to retain a sufficiently Polish 
(and preferably skilled) portion of the  ‘autochthonous’ population.50 These procedures turned 
into a reckoning not only with the Second World War but with Poland’s many national minorities 
(Mazurs, Kashubs, Warmiaks, Silesians), all of whom had difficulty finding a place in the new, 
more ethnically homogeneous postwar state. Small wonder then that disproportionately high 
numbers of them opted to seek emigration to (West) Germany. As the lands east of the Oder 
were opened up to Polonizing resettlement, what remained of this rooted, autochthonous 
population ‘had to adapt to the culture of the newcomers, not vice versa’.51  
Beata Halicka’s monograph on ‘Poland’s Wild West’ is a social history of those 
newcomers and their resettlement process, written consciously with a perspective ‘from below’. 
Hence her title refers not to the top-down official myth of ‘recovered lands’ (territory of the 
medieval Piast dynasty supposedly returned to Poland after centuries of German colonization), 
but to a popular, American-inspired ‘Wild West’ narrative of frontier conquest.52 As in occupied 
Germany, life in the newly unsettled borderlands along the Oder River was especially chaotic in 
the immediate postwar period (here 1945–48). Poles and Germans briefly lived together 
(sometimes literally, as Poles were quartered in soon-to-be-former German homes) under 
competing authorities: separate Polish military and civil administrations coexisted in some areas 
with a new German civil administration set up by the Red Army, which itself retained the last 
                                                 
48 Kulczycki, Belonging to the Nation, 37, 41. 
49 Ibid., p. 162. 
50 See also H. Service, Germans to Poles: Communism, Nationalism and Ethnic Cleansing after the Second World War 
(Cambridge, 2013). 
51 Kulczycki, Belonging to the Nation, p. 302. 
52 Halicka, Polens Wilder Westen, p. 7. 
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word.53 These created only a haphazard structure though for a resettlement process that involved 
millions. As the land emptied of Germans, Polish settlers who had been forced to leave their 
homes in the kresy (taken by the Soviet Union) arrived in ‘a foreign, deserted world’ full of 
artefacts left by previous owners whose standard of living had been much higher.54 Halicka shows 
that people responded in very different ways to the challenge of appropriating the space and 
material culture of these supposedly ‘recovered lands’: some felt forever transient in the 
borderland, while others embraced a pioneering spirit; many felt deeply uncomfortable taking the 
homes of other forced migrants, while a very small number plundered German homes for 
personal gain (at the expense of a more equitable redistribution of property for the many).55 The 
fates of both departing Germans and arriving Poles depended greatly on the precise timing, 
origin, and destination of their migration, as well as their own personal circumstances and 
attitudes.56  
The German expellee experience is generally well-documented, with several major 
monographs having appeared in English in recent years.57 Yuliya Komska’s Icon Curtain departs 
from these by focusing not on political narratives or memories of Heimat, but on how Sudeten 
German expellees engaged with the border landscape between Bavaria and Czechoslovakia. 
Unlike the Poland-GDR border (wholly inside the Soviet bloc), this was a space where Eastern 
and Western blocs met, and where the history of ‘postwar’ expulsion thus overlapped with ‘Cold 
War’ confrontation.58 Religion was central to how expellees here exerted agency over their fate, 
building a ‘prayer wall’ of chapels and towers along the border as a bulwark against the 
communist, atheist regime that had expelled them. This became part of a pilgrimage 
infrastructure, complete with holy statues miraculously transported (or just discreetly smuggled) 
from demolished German churches on the Czechoslovak side.59  
                                                 
53 Ibid., 104–109, 158–162. See also J. Musekamp, Zwischen Stettin und Szczecin: Metamorphosen einer Stadt von 1945 bis 
2005 (Wiesbaden, 2010), pp. 32–43. 
54 Halicka, Polens Wilder Westen, p. 154. On the unmixing of populations in the kresy, see K. Brown, A Biography of No 
Place: From Ethnic Borderland to Soviet Heartland (Cambridge, MA, 2004). 
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58 Y. Komska, The Icon Curtain: The Cold War's Quiet Border (Chicago, 2015), pp. 34–36. 
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The region also attracted more conventional nature tourism to the divided ‘Bavarian’ or 
‘Bohemian Forest’.60 Whereas the photo albums of ordinary German tourists were filled with 
images of ‘recognizable vast or spectacular vistas’, those of Sudeten Germans contained photos 
of ‘nondescript fields or forest clearings’, with family members pointing into the distance beyond 
where their former homes lay.61 Sudeten Germans cultivated longings for their former Heimat not 
only through photographic representations but also by looking directly at it, even building 
lookout towers along the border. The views these towers framed of selected towns carried 
different connotations from similar towers along the inter-German border, whose meanings were 
overwhelmingly anti-communist. 62  Mixing this ‘Cold War’ message with one about ‘postwar’ 
expulsion, the Bavarian-Czech border had more limited general appeal and remained a ‘quiet 
border’ of the Cold War. Komska thus uses the specificity of this unusual landscape to argue that 
there was not simply one, but ‘many Iron Curtains’.63 
Both Komska and Kopp are based in cultural studies rather than history, and they are 
among the most creative in their use of sources. In reconstructing Sudeten German experiences, 
Komska draws on a range of literary and visual materials, from poetry and illustrations in expellee 
publications to prayer leaflets, photographs, and landscapes themselves. Kopp’s study dissects 
colonialist attitudes embedded not only in literature and maps but also in film (Fritz Lang’s 1924 
Nibelungen). The interdisciplinary approaches of these two authors allow them to shift 
substantially the perspective on their topics, showing in Kopp’s case how imperialist thinking was 
continually reproduced and, in Komska’s, how expulsion was lived and worked through in the 
Czech-Bavarian borderland. The works by Kulczycki, Halicka, and Polak-Springer are more 
closely interrelated, dealing with different aspects of German-Polish conflict. Kulczycki’s is a 
comprehensive synthesis of literature on nationality policies, but he nevertheless has a clear eye 
for detail, picking out telling examples from published primary sources and using them to 
differentiate by region.64 Polak-Springer and Halicka have both mined the archives to produce 
their research. Polak-Springer’s case study of Upper Silesia is distinguished by his consistently 
transnational approach and argument, which cleverly highlights the unexpected overlaps (and 
parallel shortcomings) of irredentists on both the German and Polish sides. Halicka’s study of the 
middle and upper Oder is focused mostly on Polish experiences, which she convincingly 
reconstructs as ‘history from below’ based on a wealth of ego documents (chiefly memoirs 
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produced for ‘writing contests’ 65 ). These three authors have combined German and Polish 
perspectives ‘from above’ and ‘from below’ in different ways, but all speak to the complexity of 
belonging within this hotly contested region.  
 
III. Everyday life at the German-German border 
Komska’s argument for a pluralization of ‘the Iron Curtain’ has also been taken up by 
several authors working on its more famous, German-German instantiations. Popular interest in 
Germany’s Cold War borders has tended to be focused on the Berlin Wall, where urban space 
proved particularly difficult to disentangle.66 Berlin was also important as a key crossing point 
between East and West, but the enclave’s unique situation makes a poor basis for generalization, 
particularly with regard to the rural spaces that made up the overwhelming bulk of the border. 
Recent scholarship has focused on a range of less urban constellations: Edith Sheffer has 
examined relations between the provincial towns of Sonneberg (Thuringia) and Neustadt bei 
Coburg (Bavaria); Sagi Schaefer has studied state-building in the farmlands of the Eichsfeld 
(extending into Hesse, Lower Saxony, and Thuringia); 67 and Jason Johnson has focused on the 
East German state’s interventions in tiny, isolated Mödlareuth (between Bavaria and Thuringia). 
Unlike along (united) Germany’s Western and Eastern borders, questions of national belonging 
and forced migration are less relevant here. Rather, these authors are all concerned primarily with 
what the construction and acceptance of borders can tell us about relations between state and 
society (the two always entangled). With locally varying degrees of success, the East and West 
German states both used division to project power into remote, rural spaces. Residents pushed 
back in ways that reshaped local realities, but they also participated in bordering processes where 
they perceived their advantage in it. On the ground, local acceptance of new borders had less to 
do with commitment to a political-economic ideology than with the everyday ‘geopolitics’ of rural 
life: relations with neighbours, practical concerns about security, economic competition, and 
access to property or resources. All three books follow similar chronologies based on the 
porosity of the border: initial postwar instability led to border controls that were dramatically 
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tightened in 1952, followed by a consolidation of the status quo (symbolized by the 1961 
construction of the Berlin Wall) until the border’s sudden demise in 1989–90.  
When Churchill declared in March 1946 that an ‘Iron Curtain’ had descended across 
Europe, few serious barriers had yet been erected within occupied Germany. In the immediate 
aftermath of the Second World War, Germans were officially forbidden from crossing between 
occupation zones, but the border between the Soviet and American or British zones was, for the 
most part, a ‘green border’ that was easily crossed. In Johnson’s Mödlareuth, for example, the 
demarcation line was a creek shallow enough to be forded and narrow enough to be jumped 
across.68 The chief obstacles to crossing were the Allied soldiers and German border police who 
patrolled the demarcation line, destabilizing life in the borderlands by their very presence. 
American troops drank, brawled and took joyrides along the border, and Red Army troops 
supplemented their own meagre provisions by extorting or stealing goods from residents. 
German border police on both sides were initially poorly paid and thus highly susceptible to 
bribery; in the American sector, they were also forbidden from using weapons within one 
kilometre of the border, making them a rather toothless form of dissuasion. 69  As a result, 
smuggling (of people and goods) was rampant. In some cases, ‘smuggling’ represented merely the 
criminalized continuation of trade disrupted by the new interzonal border. Over time though, it 
became increasingly associated with danger, as economic and security concerns became conflated 
following Currency Reform in the Western zones on 20 June 1948—not least because, as 
Schaefer shows, American and British authorities feared political destabilization through ‘cheap 
competition and orchestrated sabotage’ from the centrally planned economy next door.70 The 
Currency Reform also worsened inequality between zones, feeding Western perceptions of 
Eastern poverty and turning former neighbours into othered objects of pity and disdain. On the 
ground, the division that the West German government so loudly decried was in fact self-
reinforcing and propelled forward by its own citizens: an insecure border between unequal, 
incompatible economies led better-off West Germans especially to clamour for more protection. 
As Sheffer forcefully argues, ‘the border’s insufficiencies, ironically, enhanced its legitimacy.’71  
Increased border enforcement and incursions by one side repeatedly led to escalations by 
the other. Border policing was regionally based in both countries at first, but quickly brought 
under central control in the Soviet zone and in its East German successor state. By 1951, the 
Western Allies acquiesced to West German demands for a centralized Federal Border Protection 
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service (Bundesgrenzschutz)—a militarized policing body that for nearly 40 years would patrol a 
border that the Basic Law claimed should not exist.72 In 1952, East Germany took decisive 
measures to assert control over its part of the borderlands. ‘Operation Vermin’ (Aktion Ungeziefer) 
involved the conversion of the area adjacent to the border on the Eastern side into security zones, 
which remained in place (with small modifications) until 1989: the five-kilometre ‘prohibited area’ 
(Sperrgebiet), where residents were registered and visitors required special passes; the 500-metre 
‘protection strip’ (Schutzstreifen), in which individual residents were granted access only to their 
own specified section; and the ten-metre ‘control strip’ (Kontrollstreifen, portrayed in the West as a 
‘death strip’, or Todesstreifen), which was cleared of all structures and vegetation. Schaefer stresses 
that it took time for these measures to be implemented, meaning that it remained possible for 
years to cross the border illegally in many remote areas. However, the increased criminalization of 
border-crossing itself made it impossible to engage regularly in economic activity across the 
demarcation line, disrupting farming in particular and forcing communities on both sides to 
disentangle land ownership.73  
For Sheffer and Johnson, the significance of the 1952 border regime changes lay as much 
in the deportation action itself, which arguably traumatized borderland residents for years to 
come. Both the name of ‘Operation Vermin’ and the practices associated with it echoed the 
recent National Socialist past, a fact that Sheffer in particular emphasises: central authorities 
demanded the removal of political opponents, wealthy individuals, stateless persons, and 
‘antisocial’ elements (among others). 74  Johnson is somewhat more reluctant to make Nazi 
comparisons (referring to the operation by its initial title, Aktion X, rather than Aktion Ungeziefer), 
though he points out that deportees quite logically feared they might be sent to concentration 
camps rather than new homes in the GDR hinterland.75 Deportations from the borderland were 
disturbing not only for how they recalled the past, but because their chaotic implementation 
created fears of an uncertain future. Measures were announced on 26 May 1952, but not 
implemented for another 24 hours, leaving time for individuals (and in one case an entire 
village76) to flee to the West. Decisions about who to deport were made or reversed in the heat of 
the moment, and SED members were taken away along with former Nazis. In the rural world, 
1952 stood out more than the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961, which was accompanied 
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by further deportations (albeit more limited and more effectively organized ones). When Party 
agitators (the mansplainers of state socialism) were sent to Mödlareuth and the surrounding 
county to ‘enlighten’ (aufklären) the populace about the Wall, residents in fact wondered aloud 
why cross-border contact in Berlin had ‘“been tolerated this long. It has always been forbidden 
here’”.77 Within only a few short years, division had gone from being patchy and chaotic to a 
normal way of life.  
Between 1961 and 1989, the GDR’s border defenses became much more militarized and 
restrictive. Overall though, it was not so much the technological sophistication of ‘self-firing 
fences’ that made the border so resilient, but the citizen cooperation that underpinned the 
border’s social construction—and not only on the Eastern side. 78  Throughout the border’s 
existence, various actors found ways to turn division, with all its complications, to their advantage. 
Even before 1952, Bavarian toy manufacturers in Neustadt lost easy access to key suppliers in 
Sonneberg—but, as Sheffer explains, they also lost their nearest direct competitors. Moreover, 
they lobbied Western authorities for ‘aggressive protectionism’, accompanied by selective 
recruitment of skilled workers, which ultimately ‘transferred’ the glassblowing industry on which 
they depended from East to West.79 In the agricultural milieu that Schaefer examines, frontier 
farmers on both sides lost access to land on the other, but this time the relative advantages were 
reversed. While East Berlin happily redistributed the farmland of escaped or deported residents 
among the local community (first to collective farms and then to anyone who could maintain 
agricultural production80), Bonn initially refused any compensation to its own citizens, on the 
premise that doing so would constitute acknowledgment of East Germany and legitimize its land 
seizures. Regional and local authorities sought to make up for lost land by granting West 
Germans trusteeship of border fields belonging to farmers who were now east of the 
demarcation line. However, East Germans made their own arrangements with relatives in the 
West to take care of their fields, thus greatly reducing the acreage available for the scheme and 
exacerbating West Germany’s compensation dilemma.81  
As the border became a normalized and entrenched part of life, Westerners successfully 
lobbied for special federal borderland subsidies (Zonenrandförderung) and turned the GDR’s 
fortifications into a tourist attraction.82 After 1961, the agency of East Germans in the prohibited 
area was severely circumscribed (a fact that Johnson stresses more than Sheffer). They 
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nevertheless fought back some of the more egregious incursions into their personal lives, such as 
curfews, road closures, and demolitions.83 At the same time, many were more than willing to 
accept pervasive policing in exchange for the 15 percent salary bonus that went with life in the 
borderland.84 Ultimately, citizens in both East and West ‘learned to orient themselves toward the 
legal and institutional frameworks created by state organizations’, articulating practical, material 
demands in ways that took advantage of Cold War tensions.85 Whether they profited individually 
from division or not, they collectively went along with it, reshaping local realities through 
resistance, compliance, and the many contradictory strategies in between.  
Though these authors disagree on certain points, their arguments are broadly 
complementary. Sheffer’s thesis that borderland residents on both sides effectively built their 
own border presents a compelling challenge to traditional, top-down narratives. Schaefer and 
Johnson distance themselves from some of Sheffer’s more pointed claims largely by stressing 
regional and local particularities. Schaefer, for instance, argues that Sheffer’s townspeople could 
afford to choke off their competitors with an ‘economic blockade’, but that farmers in remote 
areas were far more dependent on cross-border networks for their economic survival. Johnson 
argues even more forcefully that ‘size matters’: in a tiny village community such as Mödlareuth, 
the presence of the East German state was more substantial than out in the fields and more 
overwhelming than in a large town with industry. Effectively, the authors’ disagreements revolve 
around how questions of scale affected the functioning of the border by changing the balance of 
power between states on either side, between state and society, and between various local actors. 
The many forms of compliance that Sheffer emphasizes go hand in hand with the fearful 
‘guardedness’ and timid resistance that Johnson identifies in Mödlareuth. Schaefer’s arguments 
usefully broaden the others’ claims about the inconsistencies of the bordering process by 
emphasizing the incomplete projection of state power into borderland communities on both 
sides. Each author thus contributes something important to a general argument that the German-
German border was built and undermined by forces from both above and below, with outcomes 
that varied according to the relative strengths of competing actors at different levels. 
 
IV. Migration anxiety in the Schengen area 
The opening of the Berlin Wall on 9 November 1989 initiated a process by which the 
German-German border ultimately disappeared. However, it also intervened in ongoing 
processes of de-bordering in Western Europe associated with the Schengen Agreement. Signed in 
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1985 but not implemented for a decade thereafter, Schengen called for the gradual abolition of 
border controls among member states, initially meaning France, Germany, the Benelux countries, 
Spain and Portugal (1995), then Italy and Austria (1997), Greece (2000) and only much later parts 
of Eastern Europe (2007). The Schengen process is thus characterized by important power 
asymmetries between East and West that have likewise shaped the discourses of about security 
and migration that are now connected with ‘Europe’.  
As Angela Siebold shows in her highly readable and enlightening study of media 
discourses surrounding Schengen, ‘open borders’ were not a new idea when Mitterrand and Kohl 
first announced a joint initiative for them in 1984; indeed, some in the press thought the idea a 
‘bluff’, since border controls between France and Germany were already rather minimal. 86 
Designed as it was for a ‘Europe’ that ended at the Elbe (in line with the mental maps of the 
Cold War), Schengen could seem like a symbolically overblown tweak of the status quo. With the 
fall of the Berlin Wall though, ‘open borders’ took on new meanings and Schengen became more 
central to European institutions.87 Openness also became more controversial, with the collapse of 
the Soviet bloc inspiring fears in Western Europe of a wave of immigration from the East. In 
part as a result, member states repeatedly postponed implementation of the agreement, first 
(according to various announcements in the press) from 1986 to 1989, then to the beginning or 
end of 1992, sometime in 1993, February or perhaps October 1994, and finally 26 March 1995.88 
This evident reluctance to actually go through with reducing border controls led Süddeutsche 
Zeitung columnist Heribert Prantl to pen an ‘obituary’ for the Schengen Agreement in September 
1995, after its supposed implementation: ‘The parents never loved their creation, and France 
finally let it starve to death’.89 
This drawn-out process was accompanied by negotiations over ‘compensatory measures’ 
(Ausgleichsmaßnahmen) that would increase restrictions on external borders in exchange for relaxing 
them internally. This constructed a sharp inside/outside dichotomy and set up a zero-sum 
relationship between ‘mobility’ and ‘security’. At the same time, the repeated implementation 
delays led to prolonged and protracted debates over the supposed dangers of ‘open borders’. 
Both Siebold and Andreas Pudlat have examined these debates in detail, with particular attention 
to police intervention in the media. In Germany, Federal Border Police representatives argued 
vigorously for the importance of border controls to policing work, insinuating that borderland 
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crime rates would soar in the absence of checkpoints. Though border police were concerned 
primarily about being transferred, demoted, or disbanded, they deployed their ‘security expertise’ 
to intervene in public debate in ways that stoked fears of borderland ‘criminality’ by ‘Polish car 
thieves’ and Eastern European gangs: in part as a result, borderland residents became 
hypersensitive even to low-level crime such as non-organized (i.e. individual) cigarette smuggling 
and traffic violations.90 As Andreas Pudlat argues in his work on policing in the Schengen area, it 
is questionable whether opening borders led to any significant loss of security. Indeed, police 
were ‘perhaps better positioned [aufgestellt] than ever’ after Schengen, empowered by 
‘compensatory measures’ that included the creation of Europol and a database shared by 
European police forces (the Schengen Information System), the institution of more mobile and 
less visible policing in an enlarged border zone, and new regulations permitting pursuit of 
criminals across borders.91 Nevertheless, as Siebold also demonstrates at length, the delayed and 
hotly debated implementation of Schengen fueled perceptions of ‘criminality’ that played on 
longstanding stereotypes about Eastern Europe and, increasingly over time, conflated ‘security’ 
with migration control.92 
This was particularly true along the German-Polish border, where openings and closings 
had been especially vertiginous. In the 1990s, the new securitizing discourse of Schengen 
combined with older German traditions of anti-Polish resentment and, as several authors have 
shown, bad memories of socialist experiences.93 Poland had kept its border to the GDR mostly 
closed until the 1960s, when both sides selectively opened it for certain kinds of labour and 
exchange visits. Passport- and visa-free travel was introduced in 1972 as a kind of ‘compensatory 
measure’ (in partial imitation of Western Europe) to shore up socialist ties in the wake of West 
German Ostpolitik.94 Some East Germans made the most of this new mobility, but many resented 
alleged Polish ‘shopping tourism’ that emptied store shelves in Görlitz, Frankurt an der Oder, 
and East Berlin. 95  As Agata Ładykowska and Paweł Ładykowski observe, open borders 
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exacerbated problems in economies that were ‘understood as discrete and bounded systems 
planned by their respective centers’, where the ‘(unplanned) circulation of goods’ had the 
potential to create chaos.96 In 1980, the GDR closed the border again in an attempt both to limit 
these economic effects and to keep out the ‘Polish bacillus’ of Solidarność.97 Poles were again 
able to travel relatively easily through the GDR to West Berlin in the late 1980s, but German 
unification and European integration turned the Oder-Neisse line back into a hard, external 
border in the 1990s. At precisely the moment when Eastern Europeans were negotiating entry to 
the EU, they encountered new restrictions on movement at the reinforced Schengen border.  
The eastern border of Schengen continued to ‘wander’ thereafter though, as the title of 
Steffi Marung’s Die wandernde Grenze suggests. Her theory-driven analysis draws on postcolonial 
influences to show how the ‘European Neighbourhood Policy’ (ENP) was designed to bind 
adjacent states to EU-determined policies and implicate them in their enforcement. Poland, an 
accession candidate at the time of the ENP’s formulation, was able to style itself as an 
intermediary between the expanding EU and eastern neighbours such as Belarus and Ukraine. 
This role confirmed Poland’s own self-understanding in relation to Eastern Europe, which 
Marung describes in terms of a ‘civilizing mission’ dating back to the Polish-Lithuanian 
commonwealth.98 Borrowing a term from Dirk van Laak’s study of German imperialism in Africa, 
she explores how Ukraine came to serve as ‘complementary space’ (Ergänzungsraum) for the EU, 
with graduated structures of enforcement allowing it to ‘take on functions for the compensation 
of deficits and the overcoming of crises diagnosed within the Union’—conceived not only in 
terms of democratization, market liberalization and security, but significantly also in terms of 
migration control.99 Marung stops short of calling the EU project ‘imperialist’ though, and argues 
that institutional ‘EUrope’ (sic) is not interested in closing itself off so much as selectively steering 
migration flows (e.g. of skilled labourers for the German economy) to its own advantage. Rather 
than a ‘wall around the West’, she argues that the ENP has led to external EU borders with ‘walls 
of varied thickness and gates opened to different degrees’.100  
The protagonists of Pierre Monforte’s study would probably not agree: for a remarkably 
broad range of French and German pro-asylum organizations, the idea of a ‘Fortress Europe’ has 
constituted a shared frame for mobilizing protest. Indeed, he argues that Ministries of the 
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Interior in France, Germany, and Italy made the EU their privileged venue for pushing through 
restrictive immigration policies, not least because this allowed them to circumvent domestic 
obstacles (courts, opposition parties, protest movements).101 As a result, pro-asylum groups of 
every stripe have had to ‘Europeanize’ to contest these policies. Monforte’s primary concern is 
with debates in the field of social movement studies, where prior scholarship had argued that 
even protest against EU policies remained rooted in national structures. Instead, he argues that 
groups in centralist France and federal Germany alike have built Europe-wide networks and 
challenged EU policies. However, humanitarian organizations like Amnesty International or 
Secours Catholique are more likely to lobby for their cause in Brussels (partly to get around 
blockages at the national level), while policitized groups like ‘Act Up’ or ‘Kein Mensch ist illegal’ 
articulate a more fundamental critique that targets national and European institutions alike.102 The 
politicized groups also mobilize more consistently in ‘transnational space’ that links national and 
European contexts, including in border regions: for example, anti-racist activists in the late 1990s 
and 2000s organized a series of ‘border camps’ in Rothenburg and Forst (German-Polish border), 
Zittau (Germany-Poland-Czech Republic), Strasbourg (Germany and France) and near Frankfurt 
airport (international transit hub). 103  Even well before the so-called ‘refugee crisis’ of 2015, 
refugees and their allies were pushing back against the limits of the ‘inside’/‘outside’ division of 
Europe that in some sense has replaced old East/West ones.  
In the very longue durée, discourses surrounding Europe’s territorial boundaries have always 
been aligned to social divisions of other kinds: as Claudia Bruns argues in her study of myths and 
maps from Antiquity to the medieval and early Modern periods, borders are layered on top of 
identities, gender relations, and racial hierarchies that have varied greatly over time. In the early 
modern period, cartographers superimposed the known physical geography of Europe onto the 
body of Christ or of the mythical figure Europa, a Phoenician princess supposedly brought to 
Ancient Greece by Zeus. Europa was depicted as a queen or war goddess by turns, her encounter 
with Zeus moving from land to sea in the Age of Exploration, and implying desire, seduction, or 
rape, depending on the gender boundaries of the moment. The continent itself was originally 
conceived as starting in the East and spreading to the West, but its axis was later flipped to 
coincide with now all-too-familiar divisions between Orient and Occident; similarly, the ‘barbaric’ 
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North and ‘civilized’ South of Antiquity have now been inverted in some of the uglier discourses 
over relations within the Eurozone, particularly between Germany and Greece.104  
Remembering such reversals might help us relativize Europe’s dismal present state: as 
Karl Schlögel reminds us, ‘we all have our own Greece and our own ruined investments, built in 
the belief that things will always continue as they have up to now.’ 105  Grenzland Europa, a 
collection of his speeches and essays, underscores just how much Europe has changed since 1989. 
The ‘big border’ of the Cold War—a border ‘in purest form’, with ‘no ifs, ands or buts’—
provided relatively simple coordinates by which most people could orientate themselves.106 The 
new Europe is more complex, building on new institutions, but also on the reactivation of once-
defunct trade routes and the recontextualization of practices from before 1989. Indeed, the 
‘cleverness’ that Eastern Europeans cultivated in order to cope with the problems of the planned 
economy has left them better-prepared for neoliberal late capitalism than their ‘crisis-
inexperienced’ confrères in Western Europe.107 In Schlögel’s view, the ‘unwinding’ (Abwicklung) 
that began for Eastern Europe in 1989 has spread to the West since 2008. However, despite a 
pervasive discourse of crisis, ‘There is a Europe that is intact and that works’, one connected less 
with top-down institutions and treaties (though these have an important role to play) and more 
with small traders (Ameisenhändler), migrant labourers, cheap flights—in short, with circulations 
and routines that bring Europeans (and non-Europeans!) increasingly into contact.108 According 
to Schlögel, Europe is a ‘continent that cannot live without borders’, but these need not be 
militarized, fear-laden bulwarks against the Other. On a more fundamental level, borders are 
‘signs of a wealth of difference’ that we should learn to live with, not least because we would be 
much the ‘poorer… without the experience of crossing’ them.109  
Conclusion 
The large body of research being produced on the topic of borders is indicative of a 
growing interest in the meanings attached to them as barriers to movement, boundaries of 
belonging, markers of inequality, and limits of state power. The contemporary relevance of much 
border scholarship is couched in relation to the value of free movement, made all the more 
meaningful by the eastward expansion of Europe since the end of the Cold War. However, the 
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positive, citizen-friendly connotations of ‘open borders’ have always coexisted with fears of 
immigration and insecurity, often tied to deeply rooted stereotypes about people and places 
outside (Western) Europe. Studies of colonialist thought in the nineteenth century and of media 
discourses in the twentieth century underscore the long-term continuity of anxieties which have 
again surged to the forefront of public discourse in the last decade.  
National belonging remains a key focus of borderland histories, but the paradigms have 
shifted. If a previous generation of scholars effectively deconstructed the primordial claims of 
nationalists by showing how state- and nation-building processes paved over or co-opted existing 
identities, 110  much of the current literature shows how a plurality of identities remained in 
circulation long after the apparent consolidation of nation-states. Residents of contested regions 
might choose from a palette of competing national and regional identities, opting for different 
ones at different times, or they might simply elect not to choose at all. National indifference was 
especially prevalent along the highly unstable German-Polish border, where colonization of the 
frontier, nationalist mobilization, and forced migration ultimately made most options 
unappetizing for populations on all sides.  
One could almost describe Germany’s ‘Iron Curtain’ in similar terms, with some citizens 
responding to state-building efforts with calculated ambivalence. Instead of identifying with a 
state ideology, they sought advantage where they could and framed their demands in Cold War 
terms if and when it suited them. Historians of the German-German border remain preoccupied 
with relations (and overlaps) between state and society, which have long been a mainstay of the 
historiography of communism. Recent scholarship has given greater weight to how local 
populations in both East and West constructed, contested, and adapted to Cold War borders, 
highlighting the role of local people in processes that were once conceived exclusively in terms of 
high politics. Whether focused on identities, colonialist thinking, the appropriation of space and 
material culture, or attitudes towards migration, the most widely shared characteristic of current 
research on borderlands seems to be attention to agency and reception ‘from below’. The best 
histories in this category are attuned to the ways in which ‘bottom-up’ processes are intertwined 
with ‘top-down’ and meso-level ones driven by international diplomacy, central states, media 
elites, and others. Yet local perspectives remain key to perceiving how urban-rural, centre-
periphery, and international relations actually played out in reality.  
Border historians borrowing from other disciplines have developed sophisticated 
techniques for working creatively with new and unconventional sources, especially visual ones. 
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Their work incites one to think about how to interpret empty fields, engineering plans, and 
derelict customs houses in terms of their past and present social implications. Building on the 
expansion from textual to visual sources, some historians are further incorporating material 
culture and the natural environment into the history of borders.111 In terms of approach, there is 
still room for more cross-fertilization between contexts, disciplines, and languages though. 
Concepts such as national indifference or the appropriation of space and material culture, so far 
developed and applied mostly in relation to Eastern Europe, might be used more widely in 
research on regions like Alsace-Lorraine. Much of the interdisciplinary creativity that has fed into 
recent research has come from cultural studies, postcolonial studies, and others rooted in the 
humanities. Geographers, anthropologists, and social scientists have much to say to historians of 
borders, as demonstrated, for example, by the work they have done together on ‘Phantom 
Borders’—boundaries that continue to structure social interactions long after their administrative 
functions have ceased.112 Likewise, English-speaking scholars can learn more from the many 
important German contributions to spatial history.113  
Cross-fertilization and comparison of this kind might have other consequences for the 
historiography of Germany and for understandings of its place in Europe. As noted above, each 
of the books reviewed here tends to fit into an existing regional historiography with its own 
general trends, though related phenomena are visible at each border. By examining different 
borders together, we can see similarities across time and space in how the borrowing and re-use 
of symbols, plans, and monuments has led to unintended convergences even in the most 
violently contested regions. We can see how local populations have employed similar strategies 
for circumventing, selectively appropriating, or resisting the actions of democratic and 
authoritarian states alike. And we can see how ‘Europe’ has come together from myriad, 
contradictory experiences with borders (from the Kaiserreich to state socialism to Schengen), 
whose enduring legacies complicate simple narratives of progress toward ‘open borders’. 
Europeanization is ‘not a uniform, unidirectional and teleological process’, and its achievements 
are subject to reversal. 114 Europe, like its border spaces, is incomplete, unstable, and continually 
being reconstructed through social practices. 
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The composite and contradictory nature of Europe is evident in the present wave of anti-
immigrant hysteria, which has flowed together from multiple, regionally specific sources. Alsace, 
for example, is not only a laboratory of European collaboration but a bastion of the far-right 
Front National, whose regional strength draws on resentment against centuries of outside 
intervention. The anti-immigrant rhetoric of Poland’s Prawo i Sprawiedliwość party derives in 
part from anger over long-standing Western stereotypes of Eastern Europe and from the 
perception that EU border policies are designed to benefit a historically domineering neighbour. 
In Germany itself, the fall of the Berlin Wall symbolized the possibilities of ‘open borders’, but 
the unification process that followed it led to the devaluation of East Germans’ experiences and 
identities, the drastic curtailment of the right of asylum, and a wave of xenophobic attacks. The 
shared, Europe-wide discourses currently targeting non-European refugees thus have little to do 
with the actions of migrants themselves and far more to do with deflecting internal problems 
onto external borders. As Karl Schlögel writes, ‘From societies that cannot cope with themselves, 
it is not to be expected that they will be up to the challenge of the new, more complex Europe.’115  
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